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1  Introduction: legal doctrines versus economic analysis 
Despite the terminology, the concept of pure economic loss originally lies in the domain of legal 
doctrines. It refers to damage consisting of a financial loss unaccompanied by physical harm.
1 
Several factors stimulate the interest of the economist in pure economic loss problems. First, the 
treatment of pure economic loss in contracts seems to be less problematic than in torts, as contract 
relies on the Roman formant that allows compensation for both damnun emergens (the concrete 
damage actually incurred) and lucrum cessans (the lost profit).
2 Secondly, although the great 
disparity in the treatment of accidents involving financial loss from accidents involving physical loss 
has been tackled from an economic viewpoint and fruitfully interpreted, the heterogeneity in the 
treatment of the former accident typology in different legal systems is largely unexplained.
3 
In relation to the first point, contract law furnishes parties with the legal environment in which 
negotiation takes place.
4 Since contractual parties generally desire protection of their economic 
interests, contract law does not hesitate to admit compensation for pure economic loss.
5 Likewise, it 
has been shown that, in cases in which the willingness of the parties not to protect such interests is 
                                                                  
1 “A pure economic loss is a financial loss which is not causally consequent upon physical injury to the plaintiff’s own 
person or property”, Bruce Felthusen, Economic Negligence. The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss, 4
th ed., Carswell: 
Canada (2000), at 1. For a recent comparative perspective, see also Michael Furmston (ed.), The Law of Tort. Policies and 
Trends in Liability for Damage to Property and Economic Loss, London: Duckworth (1986), Efstathios Banakas (ed.), 
Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss, London: Kluwer (1996), and Mario Bussani and Vernon Palmer (eds.), Pure 
Economic Loss in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003), forthcoming. 
2 See Jan M. Van Dunné ‘Liability for Pure Economic Loss: Rule or Exception? A Comparatist’s View of the Civil Law - 
Common Law Split on Compensation of Non-Physical Damage in Tort Law’, 4 European Review of Private Law (1999) 
397-428 at 398. 
3 See William Bishop, ‘Economic Loss: Economic Theory and Emerging Doctrine’, in Michael Furmston (ed.), The Law of 
Tort. Policies and Trends in Liability for Damage to Property and Economic Loss, London: Duckworth (1986), at 73 ff. 
4 See Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, 3 Journal of Law and Economics (1960) 1-44. See also David de 
Meza, ‘Coase Theorem’, in Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. 1, New 
York: Macmillan (1998) 270-281, and Steven G. Medema and Richard O. Zerbe Jr., ‘The Coase Theorem’, in Boudewijn 
Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. I, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2000) 836-
892. 
5 Contract law concerns situations in which transaction costs are low and parties can bargain. As a result, costs and 
benefits that a party may produce and that may affect the other party will be taken into account by the parties 
themselves, without the need for and irrespective of legal intervention (see on this point Coase, 1960, supra note 4). Thus, 
the economic function of contract law is to reduce the cost of contractual arrangements by facilitating the exchange of 
information, optimising the allocation of risk concerning unforeseeable events, and improving mutual commitment and 
coordination. The rule that generally allows compensation for financial loss between parties to a contract can be seen under 
this perspective. On the economic analysis of contracts, see in general Richard Craswell, ‘Contract Law: General 
Theories’, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. III, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar (2000) 1-24, and Avery Wiener Katz, ‘Contract Formation and Interpretation’, in Peter Newman (ed.), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, vol. 1, New York: Macmillan (1998) 425-432. 
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clear from the outset, pure economic loss should not be compensated.
6 By contrast, tort law enters 
the arena when bargaining is not possible, i.e. when some of the costs (or the benefits) of a party’s 
activity might fall on others without any contractual relationship being previously established (e.g., 
motorists may injure pedestrians). Thus, unlike contract law, liability rules provide mechanisms that 
make parties consider those external effects, by entitling victims to compensation.
7 The 
internalisation of external effects poses peculiar problems in the case of pure economic loss. The 
analysis of such problems will be the focus of this study and will enable us to tackle the second issue 
mentioned at the beginning of this introduction. 
Legal doctrines characterise the economic loss problem on the basis of the nature of the harm: 
purely financial loss contrasted to physical damage to property or personal injury. This dichotomy 
does not find favour in the economic analysis of law. From the latter perspective any loss is 
regarded as a decrease in the victim’s welfare, irrespective of whether such a decrease derives 
from a physical or a monetary loss. Thus, from an economic perspective both ought to be considered 
as losses of the same importance. Arguing that physical loss is of greater importance for the law 
than is financial loss only transforms the problem of what loss should be compensated into the 
problem of how different losses should be ranked. Economists have criticized this approach.
8 
Likewise, maintaining that financial loss opens the way to litigation of potentially endless suits or that 
                                                                  
6 Cases of tort liability for financial loss often concern potential contractual relationships.  Victor P. Goldberg, 
‘Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?’, 17 Journal of Legal Studies (1988) 295-312, discusses 
cases in which the parties to the tort suit could have actually protected their economic interests through contract. It is 
argued that, since they did not, such protection is to be considered undesirable and the law should not impose it through 
tort liability for pure economic loss. The case of accountants’ liability towards third parties that relied on their statements 
is distinguished from the case (apparently similar) of notaries’ and lawyers’ liability towards the intended beneficiary of a 
will negligently delayed. In the former case, liability should be excluded as parties could have specified it in contracts and 
they did not (Goldberg, 1988, at 299-308). In the latter, liability should be admitted, as the intended beneficiary should be 
seen as pursuing the interest of the testator in his intended will, which would otherwise be frustrated (Goldberg, 1988, at 
308-311). Victor P. Goldberg, ‘Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort: Another Look at Robins Dry Dock v. Flint’, 20 
Journal of Legal Studies (1991) 249-275, argues  in an analogous way. My analysis applies instead to cases in which 
transaction costs are so high as to prevent parties from contracting and hence can only be analysed under tort law. 
7 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’, 85 Harvard Law Review (1972) 1089-1128. 
8 Mauro Bussani, Vernon Palmer and Francesco Parisi, ‘The Comparative law and Economics of Pure Economic Loss’, 
George Mason University, Working Paper Series (2001), forthcoming in American Journal of Comparative Law, at 15-24 
examines and criticizes approaches based on the dichotomy between absolute and relative rights or grounded on some scale 
of human values. According to these theories, pure economic interests should not be given compensation for they attain to 
relative rights or are to be ranked at a lower level than other interests meritorious of protection. It remarks that these and 
similar arguments are ultimately bound to stimulate the question why economic loss should not be protected as absolute 
rights in the first place or be classified at a higher level. Though they might be defended on the pragmatic ground, both 
arguments fail to provide a convincing theoretical explanation of why pure economic loss should or should not be 
compensated. See also Fernando Gomez and Juan Antonio Ruiz, “The Plural and Misleading Notion of Economic Loss in 
Tort: A Law and Economics Perspective”, working paper, 4 Indret (2002). 
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financial loss is less foreseeable than physical loss is objectionable on the basis that the functioning 
of the law of torts seems not to be impaired by this problem where the damage is physical in nature. 
Consider for example class actions in product liability. Furthermore, financial loss does not seem to 
generate a distinguishable set of problems. Thus, specific legal treatment is difficult to justify on 
these grounds. Economists have expressed related concerns.
9 
Nevertheless, financial loss features a distinguishing characteristic. Physical harm always 
implies the destruction of some societal resources (in the broadest sense). In contrast, financial harm 
may or may not amount to a social loss. It might, to a certain extent,
10 simply signify a redistribution 
of wealth from one subject to another, so that the total wealth of society remains unaltered.
11 This 
point is a crucial tenet of economic analysis.
12 The pure economic loss problem may be regarded as 
a divergence between the social cost of an accident and the private cost thereof.
13 Only the former 
is relevant to society, but the concern of private parties is with the latter. The social and private 
costs diverge when an accident produces a loss for a party – the victim – while resulting in a gain 
for another party – the gainer,
14 as for instance in the typical case of lost profits due to temporary 
impairment of the victim’s premises (being to the advantage of the victim’s competitor). The socially 
                                                                  
9 Bussani, Palmer and Parisi (2001), supra note 8, provide two main reasons for the rejection of such arguments. First, 
there is no qualitative difference between physical and financial loss in relation to foreseeability and with respect to the 
potential effects of accidents; if a concern applies to financial loss, a similar concern should apply to physical loss as well. 
Secondly, for the purpose of providing optimal incentives, all consequences of an accident, no matter how widespread or 
unlikely, should be imputed to the injurer and the exclusion of some of them might impair the functioning of the tort law 
system. In addition Gomez and Ruiz (2002) at 12, supra note 8, have remarked that many, if not most, cases of pure 
economic loss concern a limited number of parties and often only one: the contracting party of the victim who suffered 
personal or proprietary harm. 
10 I wish to emphasize that a financial loss does not necessarily correspond to a pure transfer. While physical loss can 
never be a pure transfer, a financial loss may or may not be such. For example, forgone sales of a manufacturer may 
amount to a loss that is higher than the increased profits of its competitor, for production costs might be higher, transport 
costs might be relevant and consumers’ preferences might be frustrated. Hence, a financial loss may amount to a social 
loss. The effort of the economic analysis of law has been indeed mainly focused on ascertaining whether and to what 
extent financial loss can be considered as a social loss. 
11 It might be argued that an accident that causes the destruction of an automobile also generates a gain for the automobile 
industry; thus, the accident produces a transfer from the victim to the producer and no real social loss. However, the gain 
is only apparent. In fact, resources that are used to replace or repair a damaged good are diverted from other uses. After 
replacement, society ends up with the same number of automobiles but a lower level of some other activity. It is easy to 
verify that this is not the case when the accident causes a pure transfer from one party to another. 
12 For a clear taxonomy of pure economic loss cases see, among others, Bussani, Palmer and Parisi (2001), supra note 8, 
and  William Bishop and John Sutton, ‘Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages: The Shortcomings of the Pecuniary Loss 
Rule’, 15 Journal of Legal Studies (1986) 347-570, at 360 ff. 
13 For a recent assessment see Francesco Parisi, ‘Recovery for Pure Financial Loss: Economic Foundations of a Legal 
Doctrine’, in Mario Bussani and Vernon Palmer (eds.), Pure Economic Loss in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (2003), forthcoming. See Gomez and Ruiz (2002), supra note 8, for a different perspective. 
14 See also Israel Gilead, ‘Tort Law and Internalization: the Gap between Private Loss and Social Cost’, 17 International 
Review of Law and Economics (1997) 589-608, who maintains that the divergence between private loss and social cost 
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relevant loss is equal to the victim’s private loss minus the gainer’s (private) gain. Looking at gains 
deriving from someone else’s misfortune might seem odd. However, legal systems ordinarily deny 
compensation to victims of harmful activities that are beneficial for the majority. No legal system 
would award compensation if a manufacturer built a better mousetrap, thus damaging rival 
manufacturers, their employees and creditors. Moreover, after an accident has occurred, it is 
desirable for society to mitigate its impact by recognising, when necessary, the legitimacy of third 
party gains. No legal system would disgorge the profits of a hotel owner who accommodated the 
customers of its competitor, which suffered a reduction in capacity through an accident that was not 
the fault of the gainer. 
Some scholars have maintained that the private versus social loss antinomy may furnish a 
general economic explanation of the legal doctrines concerning pure economic loss.
15 Others have 
emphasized that “the problem is multiform rather than uniform in character”
16 and, hence, that the 
correct approach is not to attempt to formulate a general theory, but to adopt a pluralistic 
perspective.
17 In this study, I will show how the explanatory power of the integrated approach can 
be enhanced. For this purpose, I will regard the tort law system as a system to provide parties to an 
accident with incentives to take precautions.
18 Usually, tort liability is said to provide injurers and 
victims with incentives; the pure economic loss cases are more complex in that they also require the 
gainer to be incentivized, in so far as he can mitigate the impact of the accident on society. I will 
show that ordinary liability rules may fail at times to provide all parties with optimal incentives. This 
is because tort law  – a system conceived to deal with the internalisation of accidental harm – is 
confronted in economic loss cases with an unsuitable goal – the internalisation of accidental benefits. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
might also be due to other and more complex causes. 
15 Bussani, Palmer and Parisi (2001), supra note 8. 
16 Gary T. Schwartz, “Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J’Aire and Products Liability”, in Michael 
Furmston (ed.), The Law of Tort. Policies and Trends in Liability for Damage to Property and Economic Loss, London: 
Duckworth (1986), at 83. 
17 See also Gomez and Ruiz (2002) at 5, supra note 8. and Goldberg (1991) at 251, supra note 6. 
18 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, New Haven: Yale University Press (1970), 
also focused on other two goals of the liability system, namely, the optimal allocation of risk and the minimization of the 
administrative costs of the system itself. I will not elaborate extensively on the latter two, as my aim is to show how the 
incentive problem changes in the presence of pure economic loss. See also John Prather Brown, ‘Toward an Economic 
Theory of Liability’, 2 Journal of Legal Studies (1973) 323-350, for the first and most durable formal treatment of liability 
rules in an economic model. See, for an integrated perspective, Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident  Law, 
Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press (1987), and William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Tort Law, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press (1987). For a recent view on the topic, see Thomas J. 
Miceli, Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1997) and Robert 
D. Cooter and Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Economics, 3rd ed., Reading, Massachusetts, [etc.]: Addison-Wesley (2000). See 
also my own analysis in Giuseppe Dari Mattiacci, ‘Tort Law and Economics’, working paper (2002) forthcoming in 
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As regards future comparative analysis, I will suggest that the economic explanation of legal 
doctrines on pure economic loss and of the seemingly disparate treatment that it receives in different 
legal systems, may be enhanced by taking into account some additional factors that bear on the 
incentive effects of liability rules: the determination of negligence, the presence of other incentives 
generated by regulation, taxes or subsidies and the way the socially relevant loss depends on the 
precautions taken by the injurer, the victim and the gainer. 
This study will first illustrate the dominant economic definition of pure economic loss and 
provide the reader with an intellectual history of the economic analysis of pure economic loss in 
section 2. Section  3 will revise the traditional economic approach and underline its pros and cons. 
Section 4 constitutes the analytical part of this study and provides a formal economic analysis of the 
problem. With these results in mind, section  5 will relate my findings to the literature and formulate 
some new research hypotheses to be tested by the intersecting disciplines of comparative legal 
scholarship and law and economics. Section 6 will provide some concluding remarks. For the sake of 
clarity, it is worthwhile remarking that the terms ‘recovery rule’ and ‘exclusionary rule’ will be 
employed throughout this study using their economic meanings. Under the ‘recovery rule’, the victim 
is entitled to full compensation of his loss. Under the ‘exclusionary rule’, the victim is only entitled to 
compensation of the socially relevant loss (victim’s loss minus gainer’s gain). 
2  An (unsettled) intellectual history of the economic theories of pure economic loss 
The question of whether a pure economic loss should or should not be compensated was first 
analysed through an economic lens by Bishop.
19 He remarked that in the majority of the cases in 
which the law hesitates to award compensation to the victim for financial loss there is a divergence 
between the social loss (the loss that the accident inflicts upon society at large) and the private loss 
(the loss that the victim suffers), which justifies such denial of recovery. 
For the purpose of socially optimal deterrence, injurers should be made liable for the harm they 
cause to society, which constitutes an external effect of their activity. Intuitively, ceteris paribus, the 
level of precaution that an injurer should take depends on how serious the accidents he may cause 
are. If the harm is very low or improbable, it is not desirable to spend too much on preventing it; on 
the contrary, for very probable harm, a very high level of precaution should be required. For 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Artides Hatzis ed., Economic Analysis of Law: A European Perspective: Edward Elgar. 
19 William Bishop, ‘Economic Loss in Tort’, 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1982a) 1-29. 
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example, if the expected harm
20 of an accident amounts to €20 and preventing it would cost €30, 
then it is desirable not to prevent the accident and indeed an injurer who has to decide whether to 
take precaution in order to prevent the accident or to pay damages to the victim will choose the 
latter. On the contrary, were the expected harm equal to €31 or higher, an expenditure of €30 on 
precautions would be worthwhile, and the threat of liability would be sufficient to induce the injurer 
to take such precautions. Therefore, it is important correctly to determine the magnitude of the 
expected harm imputable to the accident. 
The core of Bishop’s argument is that some victims’ losses do not amount to a social loss 
because they are set-off by someone else’s gain. Suppose that A damages B’s shop causing a 
physical damage of €20 and lost earnings equal to €25. However, the nearby shop owned by C 
takes over B’s customers and increases its sales by the same amount (€25).
21 The social loss in this 
case is only the physical damage to B’s shop, the resources that are destroyed in the accident. B’s 
lost earnings are not a social loss because there is no resource actually destroyed; since consumers 
can buy from C, the accident causes a mere transfer from B to C. If A’s precaution costs amount to 
€30, then it is socially desirable that A does not take precautions to prevent the social loss of €20. If 
A is only rendered liable for €20, he will take no precautions. However, if he has to compensate B 
also for his lost earnings, he will face a liability equal to €45, and will find it advantageous to spend 
€30 on precautions – which is an inefficient outcome, given our assumptions. 
Bishop suggested that only social losses should enter the calculation of the damage award, 
while any private loss should be left uncompensated. His paper was the progenitor of the economic 
analysis of pure economic loss cases and it was the subject of an immediate debate with Rizzo.
22 
Rizzo’s critique was predominantly based on the observation that, in the example, C’s ability to 
absorb B’s customers in the event of an accident depends on the fact that C can serve more 
customers than he ordinarily does. Such excess capacity is in itself inefficient as it diverts resources 
from alternative valuable uses.
23 If financial loss is not compensated, there will be more accidents 
and consequently greater incentives to increase capacity. 
                                                                  
20 The expected harm is the product of probability of an accident and magnitude of the consequent harm. 
21 The example should not confuse the reader who finds that C’s gain might be lower than B’s lost profits. The point I 
wish to make is not that all financial losses are set-off by someone else’s gain, but rather that the portion of B’s loss (not 
necessarily all of it) that corresponds to C’s gain is not a social loss. 
22 See Mario J. Rizzo, ‘The Economic Loss Problem: A Comment on Bishop, 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1982a) 
197-206, who commented on Bishop (1982a) supra note 19, and the consequent reply in William Bishop, ‘Economic 
Loss: A Reply to Professor Rizzo’, 2 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1982b) 207-210. See also Rizzo’s own analysis in 
Mario J. Rizzo, ‘A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts’, 11 Journal of Legal Studies (1982b) 281-310. 
23 See Rizzo (1982a) at 202 and (1982b) at 286 ff., supra note 22. 
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The divergence between Bishop’s and Rizzo’s approaches does not rest on the fundamental 
explanation of the problem, but rather on the weight that each gives to the discrepancy between 
private and social loss in the real world: Bishop argued that sometimes the private loss is greater 
than the social loss and, therefore, that a private loss should be compensated only to the extent to 
which it corresponds to a social loss. Rizzo did not contest the correctness of such an argument, but 
maintained that in the real world, due to excess capacity, any private loss should be considered a 
social loss.
24 Nevertheless, he defended the exclusionary rule for a different reason: it provides 
parties with incentives to channel economic loss into contracts and reduces the administrative costs 
of the judicial system. This argument did not succeed in providing a general alternative to Bishop’s 
approach and has been the target of several criticisms. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that 
also Rizzo grounded his analysis on the (factually criticized but theoretically accepted) divergence 
between social and private loss. 
Rizzo’s argument can be summarised as follows: if A causes B to suffer physical damage (e.g. 
A damages B’s shop) and C to bear merely financial loss (due to the fact that B cannot supply C), 
then C’s loss should be compensated to the extent to which it is taken into account in the contract 
between B and C. This saves the transaction costs of ascertaining ex post the size of C’s loss and 
induces parties to determine it ex ante.
25 The problem that might arise is that B and C might 
intentionally exaggerate the ex ante estimation of the loss, as the benefit of overvaluing the loss goes 
directly to C – and indirectly, through the price of the contract, to B – while the cost is completely 
borne by A. In other words B and C determine what A will have to pay as damage compensation to 
C. The judicial system is called to ensure that the estimate is reasonable.
26 Ultimately, the reduction 
in the cost of estimating C’s loss might be offset by the cost of controlling B and C’s determination 
of the same loss so that no transaction-cost saving might derive from the denial of compensation for 
financial loss not channelled into contracts and transaction costs might actually increase.
27 
                                                                  
24 See Rizzo (1982a) at 201 and Rizzo (1982b) at 281 in the asterisked footnote, supra note 22. 
25 See Rizzo (1982b) at 283 ff., supra note 22. 
26 See Rizzo (1982b) at 295, supra note 22. 
27 For other critiques of Rizzo, see Bishop (1986) at 74 to 77,  supra note 3, who remarks that (1) few business 
relationships are disrupted as a consequence of an accident, while Rizzo’s theory requires all those who expect a future 
financial gain to indemnify themselves through contracts, with relevant negotiation costs; (2) negotiation costs may be 
very high even within a contractual relationship; (3) contracts may be standardized and not allow for indemnification; (4) 
indemnification might be excessive, as explained in the text; (5) litigation might result in settlement and hence trigger lower 
costs than expected; (6) Rizzo presents no theory of how to change the law. Gomez and Ruiz (2002) at 15, supra note 8, 
further remark that channelling is not possible in all those instances in which there is no direct physical victim with whom 
those who suffer financial damage might negotiate an indemnification clause.  
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All subsequent analyses of the problem, though taking slightly different directions and yielding 
often contrasting conclusions, have been based on these theoretical foundations: to the extent to 
which the private loss of a party is set-off by the private gain of another party, such loss should not 
be compensated.
28 Such an approach has proven to be highly successful in explaining the logic 
behind recovery and exclusionary rules. Nevertheless, it has failed to explain the variety of legal 
solutions to the problem of pure economic loss.
29 
3  Revising the economic approach 
3.1  Pure economic loss and the simultaneous internalisation of positive and negative 
externalities 
As a matter of theory, the traditional economic interpretation of the pure economic loss problem is 
only the second step in the analysis of the problem. I shall step backwards and, before asking what a 
pure economic loss is, shall define the framework in which a pure economic loss takes place.
30 
In its simplest and most basic formulation, the problem of pure economic loss is a problem of 
internalising externalities. In this respect, it is a common problem in tort law, for tort law – from a 
law and economics standpoint  – is a mechanism for internalising  externalities that voluntary 
bargaining would not internalise due to high transaction costs.
31 In fact, the problem is one of 
internalising  multiple externalities. However,  this problem is also common in tort law, as it often 
happens that a single injurer harms more than one victim. The fact that one single act may cause 
more than one (external) harm does not change the functioning of the tort law system.
32 What is 
peculiar to the case of pure economic loss is the sign of the externalities produced in the accident: 
                                                                  
28 See Bishop (1982a) at 4 supra note 19, Shavell (1987) at 135-140, supra note 18, Landes, and Posner (1987) at 251-
255, supra note 18, Victor P. Goldberg, ‘Recovery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill’, 23 Journal 
of Legal Studies (1994) 1 -40, Jennifer Arlen, ‘Tort Damages’, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. II, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (2000) at 713, Bussani, Palmer and Parisi (2001), 
supra note 8, and Hans-Bernd Schäfer, ‘Liability for Experts and the Boundary between Tort and Contract’, 3 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law (2002) 453-473. 
29 See Bishop (1986) at 73, supra note 3. Of the same opinion Schwartz (1986), supra note  16, and Gomez and Ruiz 
(2002), supra note 8. To the contrary see Bussani, Palmer and Parisi (2001), supra note 8. 
30 In this respect, I endorse Goldberg’s desire for a rethinking of the intellectual apparatus employed in analysing pure 
economic loss cases. See Goldberg (1991) at 275, supra note 6. 
31 Calabresi and Melamed (1972), supra note 7. 
32 Economic analysis has also successfully interpreted the mirror case of a single externality being produced by multiple 
wrongful acts. See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, ‘Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis’, 9 Journal 
of Legal Studies (1980) 517-555. 
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besides a negative externality (the victim’s harm) the accident generates a positive externality (the 
gainer’s gain).
33 Tort law is a system for the internalisation of negative externalities, but it is less 
suitable in the case of positive externalities, as the production of incentives for all the parties involved 
becomes a difficult task.
34 
My claim is, therefore, that the problem should be characterized as the simultaneous 
internalisation of positive and negative externalities, which does not necessarily imply that 
externalities of different signs should be set-off against each other in the calculation of the net social 
cost. I will show that the latter procedure is a mere theoretical shortcut, often justified by the factual 
situation. However, it may not always be the best solution to the problem. I will argue that a mere 
algebraic summation of the externalities produced in an accident and the definition of such a 
summation as the social cost is a dangerous step and might yield sub-optimal outcomes even if the 
gain really sets-off the harm. 
3.2  Capacity as precaution: Unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral precaution accidents 
We have noticed that the economic analysis of pure economic loss has been centred on the crucial 
problem of the size of damages, the question being whether the injurer should compensate the 
financial loss borne by the victim. This insistence is anomalous in two respects. 
First, economic models of tort law have clarified that the size of the damage award has 
different effects on the behaviour of the injurer depending on whether the rule in force is strict 
liability or simple negligence. The literature on pure economic loss has not taken into account such a 
difference, which will be stressed in the next sections. 
Second, in the academic exchanges over the compensation of financial loss, it has often been 
supposed that the size of the loss – and of the corresponding third party gain – is likely to depend on 
the capacity of the parties involved in the accident.
35 If it is evident that the injurer can reduce the 
                                                                  
33 See Bishop (1982a) supra note 19 at 9-10. Parisi (2003), supra note 13, suggests the use of negative liability in those 
cases in which the gainer’s gain overtakes the victim’s loss. This issue is not considered here. See also infra note 38. 
34 Donald Harris and Cento Veljianovsky, ‘Liability for Economic Loss in Tort’, in Michael Furmston (ed.), The Law of 
Tort. Policies and Trends in Liability for Damage to Property and Economic Loss, Duckworth, London (1986) showed 
that when both the victim and the injurer can take precautions in order to prevent an accident that may generate pure 
economic loss, providing the injurer with incentives often conflicts with providing the victim with incentives. The tort 
system may not be able to extract both parties’ optimal precaution, rendering a second best solution the only feasible 
outcome. In my analysis, I further elaborate this line of reasoning and furnish a more general analysis of the behaviour of 
the three parties to an accident. 
35 The earliest criticism to Bishop’s economic interpretation was in fact based on this point. See Bishop (1982a), supra 
note 19, and Rizzo (1982a), supra note 22. 
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expected accident loss by taking precautions, it is likewise clear that, on the one hand, the victim can 
often mitigate the harmful effects of the accident by increasing his capacity and, on the other hand, 
the gainer can similarly augment his gain by doing the same. Imagine the case in which a firm’s 
production is impaired by a shortage of supply: the size of the firm’s storage affects the magnitude 
of the loss. Likewise, the gain of the firm’s competitor also depends on his storage, which enables 
him to absorb some of the foregone sales of the other. 
Commentators have often argued that overcapacity  – i.e. a higher capacity than in a world 
without mishaps – is inefficient.
36 However, capacity can be seen as a form of victim’s and gainer’s 
precaution,
37 both leading to a reduction in the social loss. The optimal solution will often be a 
combination of some levels of injurer’s, victim’s and gainer’s precaution. Thus, the question is not 
whether or not overcapacity is efficient; the correct question is what the optimal level of capacity is. 
In most cases, such optimal level will be higher than in an ideal world without mishaps. 
Since more than one party is usually involved in an economic loss problem, the problem is not 
only the determination of the size of the damage award, but also (in fact mainly) the determination of 
the correct negligence criterion to apply. The next sections will be devoted to an examination of the 
interaction between the magnitude of the  damage award  – characteristic of pure economic loss 
cases – and the determination of negligence. It will become soon clear that the design of a rule that 
provides optimal incentives to all the parties is rather a cumbersome exercise and that often neither 
the recovery rule nor the exclusionary rule guarantees the efficient outcome. 
4  A formal analysis of the pure economic loss problem 
We will analyse accidents involving only three parties: the victim as the party that suffers the loss, 
the gainer as the party that benefits from the gain and the injurer as the final party. We will 
separately consider three general cases: first, unilateral precaution accidents (only the injurer can 
take precautions); secondly, bilateral precaution accidents (either the injurer and the victim or the 
injurer and the gainer can take precautions); and thirdly, trilateral precaution accidents (all three 
parties can take precautions). 
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, it will be assumed that the injurer is 
able to reduce the probability of the accident without affecting the magnitude of the loss and the 
                                                                  
36 See Rizzo (1982a) and (1982b), supra note 22. 
37 On the possibility that parties other than the injurer may be able to mitigate the accident loss see also Goldberg (1994) 
supra note 28. 
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gain. The victim is assumed to be either passive (sections 4.1 and  4.3) or able to mitigate the 
magnitude of the accident loss by increasing his capacity. The gainer’s gain depends on the victim’s 
loss. For simplicity we only consider cases in which the gainer’s gain is lower than the victim’s loss, 
as for instance in the case in which a seller takes over some sales of the temporarily closed 
competitor. Therefore, it also seems reasonable to assume that the gainer’s gain decreases if the 
victim’s capacity increases (the smaller the number of customers that the victim is unable to serve 
after the accident, the lower the gainer’s potential gain). The gainer is either passive (sections 4.1 
and 4.2) or able to increase the size of his gain by increasing his capacity. 
All parties are assumed to be strangers to each other and rational, wealth maximizing, and risk 
neutral actors. Causation is assumed to be satisfactorily established. Issues related to the activity 
levels of the parties are not considered. Only tort liability applies: that is, the gainer is never asked to 
pay compensation for the gain received. The objective of tort law is considered to be the 
minimization of the aggregate costs of the accident, defined as the algebraic sum of precaution costs, 
accident loss and benefit. 
4.1  Unilateral precaution accidents 
In this section, we will analyse accidents that can only be prevented by the injurer’s precautions. 
The victim and the gainer are passive actors. For simplicity, we will assume all functions to be 
continuous and continuously differentiable to any desired order. 
Let (subscripts denote derivatives): 
  x  =  the injurer’s precaution cost;   
  p(x)  =  the probability of an accident occurring, 0<p(x)<1, px<0, pxx>0; 
  h  =  the magnitude of the harm to the victim; 
  g  =  the gainer’s gain, h>g>0;
 38 
  d  =  damage compensation paid by the injurer to the victim. 
We will prove the following proposition: 
                                                                  
38 It has been remarked that the gain might be greater than the loss and that the accident might actually be beneficial to 
society at large, while being detrimental to the victim; see Parisi (2003) at 7, supra note 13, and Arlen (2000), supra note 
28, and the examples provided in the introduction. In order to confine the analysis to the domain of pure economic loss we 
assume that the gain cannot exceed the loss. 
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Proposition 1. When only the injurer can take precautions, the exclusionary rule is optimal 
under strict liability, while both the recovery rule and the exclusionary rule are optimal 
under simple negligence. 
Other negligence rules, such as strict liability with defence available of negligence, comparative 
negligence and contributory negligence, make no sense as the victim is assumed to be passive. 
Hence he cannot be found negligent. 
4.1.1  The socially optimal level of precaution 
The social cost minimization objective is given by 
(1)    ( ) [ ] x g h x p
x
+ - ) ( min . 
Let x* be the (unique) level of x that minimizes Exp. (1). Thus, x* is the socially optimal level of the 
injurer’s precaution.  
4.1.2  Strict liability 
Under strict liability, the injurer pays damages d to the victim with probability p(x) and bears also his 
precaution costs. The injurer’s minimization problem is: 
(2)  [ ] x d x p
x
+ ) ( min . 
It is clear that the total cost the injurer bears is equal to the total cost society at large bears only if 
d=h-g, that is, only if the exclusionary rule applies, where the damage award equals the true social 
cost and does not include the private cost for the victim that is set-off by the gainer’s gain. It is easy 
to verify that: if compensation equals  h-g, the injurer will take optimal precaution  x*; if 
compensation exceeds  h-g, the injurer will take too high a level of precaution  x>x*; while, if 
compensation is lower than h-g, the injurer will take too low a level of precaution x<x*. 
4.1.3  Simple negligence 
Under a rule of simple negligence the injurer has to pay compensation to the victim only if he is at 
fault, i.e. only if his level of precaution is lower than the required level. Let us assume that the 







* if ) (
* if
x x x d x p
x x x
. 
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Clearly, the injurer has no incentive to take more precaution than  x*, because he would only 
increase his precaution costs without any further benefit, since he does not pay damages when he is 
non-negligent. Thus, a non-negligent injurer bears x*. Both the cost that a negligent injurer bears and 
the choice between being negligent and being non-negligent depend on the size of d. 
If d‡h-g, the injurer will take x*; in fact, if d‡h-g the second expression in (3) is minimized by 
x‡x*; thus, it is anyway advantageous for the injurer to take at least x*, in order to reduce his total 
cost. Nonetheless, once he takes x*, he is non-negligent and pays no damages. Hence he will not 
take more than x*. 
If d<h-g, however, there is a risk that the injurer will not take x*, but will opt for a lower level 
of precaution. In fact, the second expression in (3) is minimized by x<x* this time, and hence if d is 
sufficiently low, it might be convenient for the injurer to be negligent and pay (a low) damages 
award rather than to be non-negligent and bear a (high) precaution cost. Let x^<x* be the level of 
precaution that minimizes p(x)d+x when d<h-g: the injurer will be negligent if p(x^)d+x^<x*.
39 
This analysis shows that both the exclusionary rule (under which a negligent injurer pays only 
the socially relevant harm,  h-g) and the recovery rule (under which a negligent injurer pays the 
private loss, h) are efficient, provided that the required level of precaution is set at the optimal level. 
Problems only arise when not even the socially relevant loss is compensated. 
4.2  Bilateral precaution accidents (injurer and victim) 
In this section, we will analyse accidents that can be prevented by the injurer’s precaution and by 
the victim’s. In this case, the victim can increase his capacity in order to mitigate the loss he bears 
and consequently reduce the potential gain for the gainer. On the contrary, the gainer is a passive 
actor. In addition to what was specified in section 4.1, let: 
  y  =  the victim’s capacity (mitigation) cost; 
  h(y)  =  the victim’s loss, hy<0, hyy>0; 
  g(y)  =  the gainer’s gain, h(y)>g(y)>0, hy<gy<0, hyy>gyy>0, for any y.
40 
We will prove the following proposition: 
                                                                  
39 Note that under the model described by Grady and Kahan, where the negligent injurer does not pay for the damages that 
would have occurred anyway even if he were non-negligent, the injurer takes x<x* whenever d<h-g. See Mark F. Grady, 
‘A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence’, 92 Yale Law Journal (1983) 799-829 and Marcel Kahan, ‘Causation 
and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule’, 18 Journal of Legal Studies  (1989) 427-447. 
40 See footnote 38 supra. 
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Proposition 2. When only the injurer and the victim can take precautions, neither the 
recovery rule nor the exclusionary rule is generally optimal under strict liability (with or 
without a negligence defence) or under simple negligence. 
The results concerning simple negligence also apply to contributory and comparative negligence. 
4.2.1  The socially optimal level of precaution 
The social cost minimization objective is given by 
(4)  ( ) [ ] y x y g y h x p
y x
+ + - ) ( ) ( ) ( min
,
. 
Assuming strict convexity, let x* and  y* be the (unique) socially optimal levels of x and y that 
minimize Exp. (4). The two first order conditions are px(h(y)-g(y))=-1 and p(x)(hy-gy)=-1. 
4.2.2  Strict liability 
Under strict liability, on the one hand, the injurer pays damages to the victim, hence his minimization 
problem is the same as in Exp. (2), whose first order condition is pxd=-1. It is clear that the injurer 
will choose  x* if  d=h(y*)-g(y*), that is, if compensation is equal to the pure social loss 
(exclusionary rule) and if the victim takes optimal precaution y*. 
On the other hand, the victim bears his loss minus the compensation paid by the in jurer. His 
minimization problem is: 
(5)  ( ) [ ] y d y h x p
y
+ - ) ( ) ( min . 
Under the exclusionary rule, the victim will receive  d=h(y)-g(y), and he will have to bear the 
remaining loss, which is equal to h(y)-d=g(y). Therefore, ironically, he will minimize the gainer’s 
gain instead of his loss. The first order condition of the victim’s minimization problem is p(x)gy=-1, 
which will generally be different from the first order condition of the social cost minimization 
problem and will, therefore, yield an inefficient outcome. Conversely, if the victim takes a level of 
precaution different from the optimal level y*; the injurer’s level of precaution will also change. For 
the victim to take the optimal level of precaution, d should be set at g(y), but this level of damages is 
not compatible with the injurer’s incentives, as noted  supra. It is clear that it will generally be 
impossible to set d so that both the victim and the injurer take the optimal level of precaution 
because the level of damages that would provide the injurer with optimal incentives induces the 
victim to take an inefficient level of precaution and vice versa. 
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4.2.3  Simple negligence 
The injurer’s minimization problem is again the same as in the unilateral precaution case of Exp. (3). 
Therefore, the taken level of precaution will also be the same as before: if d‡h(y*)-g(y*) the injurer 
will take  x*, if the victim also takes optimal precautions. Both the exclusionary rule and the recovery 
rule are efficient provided that the required level of precaution is set at the optimal level. However, 
under simple negligence, the non-negligent injurer pays no compensation to the victim. Thus, given 
x*, the victim bears his full loss h(y) and his minimization problem is: 
(6)  [ ] y y h x p
y
+ ) ( ) ( min . 
It is clear that, given x*, the victim will take y>y* as he bears a higher cost than the social cost. 
4.2.4  Strict liability with defence of contributory negligence 
Under strict liability with defence of contributory negligence, the victim is entitled to receive 
compensation from the injurer only if non-negligent. Assuming that the due level of precaution is set 
at the optimal level y*, the victim’s minimization problem is: 






* if ) ( ) (
* if ) ( ) (
y y y y h x p
y y y d y h x p
. 
Note that the first Exp. in  (7) yields a lower total cost for the victim than the second for any x. 
Moreover, if the victim is negligent, the injurer pays no damages and his optimal response to y<y* is 
x=0, which increases even further the victim’s cost and reinforces our previous conclusion. 
Consequently, the victim will take at least y*. 
The injurer’s minimization problem is the same as under strict liability because non-negligent 
victims are entitled to compensation. Hence, the exclusionary rule should apply in order to provide 
the injurer with appropriate incentives. Under such a rule, a non-negligent victim bears a residual 
loss equal to g(y).
41 Hence, the first Exp. in (7) becomes p(x)g(y)+y. There are two possible levels 
of y that minimize the former. (i) If the solution to p(x)gy=-1 is y^£y*, the outcome will be efficient, 
as the victim will always prefer to take y*. In fact, any lower or higher level of y would result in a 
higher total cost. However, (ii) if the solution is y^>y*, the victim will take too much precaution, 
                                                                  
41 Recall that under the exclusionary rule the injurer pays compensation d equal to h(y)-g(y). 
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which will also affect the injurer’s level of precaution.
42 Summarising, recovery impairs the injurer’s 
incentives while the exclusionary rule might at times result in the victim being over-precautious. 
4.3  Bilateral precaution accidents (injurer and gainer) 
In this section, we will analyse accidents that can be prevented by the injurer’s precaution and by 
the gainer’s precaution, in the sense that the gainer can increase his capacity and hence his 
expected gain and therefore can reduce the socially relevant harm (given by the victim’s loss minus 
the gainer’s gain). 
In addition to what was specified in section 4.1, let: 
  z  =  the gainer’s capacity (gain-enhancing) cost; 
  g(z)  =  the gainer’s gain, h>g(z), gz>0, gzz<0. 
We will prove the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. When only the injurer and the gainer can take precautions, the exclusionary 
rule is optimal under strict liability, while both the recovery rule and the exclusionary 
rule are optimal under simple negligence. 
As in  section  4.1, other negligence rules, such as strict liability with an available defence of 
negligence, comparative negligence or contributory negligence, make no sense because the victim is 
assumed to be passive. Hence he cannot be found negligent. 
4.3.1  The socially optimal level of precaution 
The social cost minimization objective is given by 
(8)  ( ) [ ] z x z g h x p
z x
+ + - ) ( ) ( min
,
. 
Assuming strict convexity, let x* and  z* be the (unique) socially optimal levels of injurer’s and 
gainer’s precautions that minimize Exp. (8). The two first order conditions are px(h-g(z))=-1 and 
p(x)gz=1. 
4.3.2  Strict liability 
The gainer will act as to maximize his expected gain minus his gain-enhancing cost. 
                                                                  
42 If the victim takes y>y*, the injurer’s cost decreases and hence also his level of precaution will be reduced. As a result, 
the victim’s cost increases and consequently his level of precaution may be further boosted.  
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(9)  [ ] z z g x p
z
- ) ( ) ( max . 
The first order condition is p(x)gz=1, which is equal to the second first-order condition of Exp. (8). 
Hence, the gainer will take the optimal level of gain-enhancing precaution z*, if the injurer takes x*. 
Moreover, under strict liability, the injurer compensates the victim’s loss. Hence, his minimization 
problem is the same as in Exp. (2). It is clear that the injurer will choose x* only if d=h-g(z*): that 
is, only if the exclusionary rule correctly applies and if the gainer takes z*. Thus, the exclusionary 
rule leads to both the injurer and the gainer taking the optimal levels of precaution. 
4.3.3  Simple negligence 
Under simple negligence, the gainer’s maximization problem is the same as under strict liability. The 
injurer’s minimization problem is the same as in the unilateral precaution case of Exp. (3). Therefore, 
the level of precaution taken will be the same as well: if d‡h-g(z*), the injurer will take x*. Both the 
recovery rule and the exclusionary rule are efficient provided that the required level of precaution is 
set at the optimal level. 
4.4  Trilateral precaution accidents 
In this section, we will analyse accidents that can be prevented by the precaution of all parties. In 
addition to what was specified in section 4.1, let: 
  y  =  the victim’s capacity (mitigation) cost; 
  h(y)  =  the victim’s loss, h(y), hy<0, hyy>0; 
  z  =  the gainer’s capacity (gain-enhancing) cost; 
  g(y,z) =  the gainer’s gain, h(y)>g(y,z) for any y and z,
43 hy<gy<0, hyy>gyy>0, gz>0, gzz<0. 
We will prove the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. When the injurer, the victim and the gainer can take precautions, neither the 
recovery rule nor the exclusionary rule is generally optimal under strict liability with or 
without a negligence defence and under simple negligence. 
4.4.1  The socially optimal level of precaution 
The social cost minimization objective is given by 
                                                                  
43 See note 38 supra. 
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(10)  ( ) [ ] z y x z y g y h x p
z y x
+ + + - ) , ( ) ( ) ( min
, ,
. 
Assuming strict convexity, let x*, y* and z* be the (unique) optimal levels of the parties’ precautions 
as they minimize the social cost function. 
4.4.2  Strict liability 
As we have already shown in section  4.2.2, the level of damages that provides the injurer with 
optimal incentives departs from the level of damages that provides the victim with optimal incentives. 
It is easy to verify that, in this case as well, the injurer should pay damages equal to the social cost – 
d=h(y)-g(y,z) – while the victim, in order to bear only the social loss, should be compensated for his 
purely private loss – d=g(y,z). Since these two measures of damages typically differ, there is no 
simple way to set a strict liability rule and an appropriate level for the damages award that induces 
both the injurer and the victim to take optimal precautions. 
The gainer, in this setting, also takes precautions. His maximization problem is, however, easier 
to solve, as he bears the full gain and will, therefore, take the optimal level of precaution if the other 
parties take their optimal levels – as determined by the analysis in section  4.3.2 –, which is not the 
case. Thus, the gainer’s level of precaution is likely to be distorted. 
4.4.3  Simple negligence and strict liability with a defence of contributory negligence 
Under simple negligence as well as under strict liability with a defence of contributory negligence, 
the gainer’s maximization problem is the same as under strict liability. Therefore in this case, the 
gainer will also take the optimal level of gain-enhancing precaution if the injurer takes x* and the 
victim takes  y*. Hence, the problem is indeed to induce the injurer and the victim to take their 
optimal levels of precaution and it can be described in the same way – but for some minor changes 
in the formulae – as shown in sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4. In general, neither the recovery rule nor the 
exclusionary rule necessarily yields an optimal result.  
5  New hypotheses on the economics of pure economic loss 
Our conclusions should furnish us with the necessary foundations for an enriched economic 
approach to the economic loss problem and give us the opportunity to discuss the consequences 
thereof for the comparative study of the differing solutions provided b y various national legal 
systems. 
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5.1  Genesis and physiology of the pure economic loss problem: internalising positive 
externalities through tort law 
The pure economic loss problem originates from the use of the tort law system for a hybrid task. 
Although tort law is – in the view of economists – a mechanism to internalise negative externalities, 
in pure economic loss cases tort liability is geared towards the internalisation of both negative and 
positive externalities. This generates the problem with which we are concerned.  What is required is 
an adjustment of the magnitude of the damages that the victim is entitled to recover. The point is that 
this is not the same as maintaining that the problem is generated by a divergence between privately 
and socially relevant loss. The latter formulation, in fact, suggests that positive and negative 
externalities should always be summed up algebraically and only the net result should be considered, 
which (as we have seen) is not always the efficient policy solution. In fact, the exclusionary rule 
generally provides optimal incentives for the injurer but not for the victim.
44 
5.2  Phenomenology of the pure economic loss problem: the divergence between private and 
social loss 
The traditionally claimed divergence between social and private loss is a matter of phenomenology. 
The simultaneous internalisation of negative and positive externalities originates the pure economic 
loss problem and causes private and social loss to diverge. Such divergence only signals the 
presence of a pure economic loss problem, but it does not necessarily points to the most efficient 
way to solve it. Indeed a difference between the loss suffered by the victim of an accident and the 
socially relevant loss – understood as the algebraic summation of costs and benefits produced by the 
accident  – is a clear indication that the accident produced a benefit (to be internalised) and that a 
pure economic loss problem arises. However, this fact should not be considered sufficient to 
conclude that the pure economic loss should not be compensated. I have shown that, in many 
situations, compensating the victim’s private loss yields a more efficient internalisation of the two 
types of externalities. 
In addition, it has often been remarked that, whenever the social loss is reduced by a third party 
gain, such gain might be due to overcapacity: that is, the ability to produce more output immediately 
in the event of an accident. Overcapacity is regarded as inefficiency because it signifies that some 
                                                                  
44 This result was also suggested by Harris and Veljianovsky (1986), supra note 34. 
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resources are normally under-utilised.
45 I have shown that this approach is in general incorrect, since 
capacity can be regarded as a form of victim’s and gainer’s precaution. Once this conceptual step 
has been taken, it is clear that the injurer’s precaution as much as the victim’s and the gainer’s 
capacity should be regarded as joint or alternative inputs to accident prevention. 
5.3  First best solution for the pure economic loss problem: decoupling positive and 
negative liability alias exclusionary rule plus subsidy 
In the presence of a pure economic loss problem, the efficiency of the incentives created by the law 
does not only depend on the size of the damages award, upon which the interest of law and 
economics scholars has generally concentrated. Attention has been focused on the damages that the 
injurer should pay because of the preoccupation with the injurer’s incentives. However, we have 
noticed that the victim and the gainer can both affect the accident loss by adjusting their capacity. 
Thus, the legal rule should also take into account the loss that the victim bears and the gain that the 
injurer receives. It is evident that, if the injurer pays compensation equal to the social loss, the victim 
bears the remaining private loss. He bears the portion of the loss that, being set-off by the gainer’s 
gain, ought to be considered as purely private. This solution is not efficient, for the victim should also 
bear the social loss in order to have incentives to take the optimal level of precaution. Therefore, the 
exclusionary rule is only optimal in relation to the injurer’s incentives but not to the victim’s.
46 
All parties should simultaneously bear the positive and the negative externalities produced by 
their activities. A way to do this is to decouple positive and negative liability: what a party pays does 
not correspond to what the other party receives. In theory, an efficient decoupled (positive and 
negative) liability rule might be described as follows.
47 
                                                                  
45 See Rizzo (1982b) at 286 ff., supra note 22. 
46 Bishop and Sutton (1986), supra note 12, discuss this problem from a different perspective. They argue that pure 
economic loss generates a tension between producing efficient incentives for the injurer – according to which compensation 
should correspond to the social loss only  – and achieving corrective justice – according to which the victim’s purely 
private loss should be also compensated. It also maintains that this discord derives from the frequent unsuitability of the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment for removing the gainer’s gain. From this perspective, the first best solution would be for the 
injurer to pay compensation equal to the social loss and for the gainer to return the gain (which is equal to the victim’s 
purely private loss) to the victim, in order to accomplish both efficiency and justice. My analysis is divergent in two 
respects. My commencement is different, as I only focus on incentives and emphasize a conflict between those provided 
for the injurer and those provided for the victim. My conclusions are also different, for I claim that it is in general optimal 
not to disgorge the gainer’s gain, for the sake of providing him with incentives as well. 
47 It is sensible to repeat that some of the conclusions, but not the general point of this study depend on the assumptions 
made, and may change under different assumptions. See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che, ‘Decoupling Liability: 
Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’, 22 Rand Journal of Economics (1991) 562-570 on decoupling strategies in 
ordinary tort liability. 
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1.  The injurer produces a negative externality for the victim and a positive externality for 
the gainer, and he should bear both: he should pay damages equal to the victim’s loss 
and receive a compensation for the gainer’s benefit. 
2.  The victim, by reducing his loss, also reduces the gainer’s gain, and, hence, he should 
bear both: he should receive no compensation for his loss, but receive compensation 
equal to the gainer’s gain. 
3.  The gainer can only increase the size of his gain, and therefore should be allowed to 
keep it entirely.   
No traditional tort liability rule is compatible with the framework just outlined. Damages payable by 
the injurer (equal to the full loss) should typically differ from the damages the victim should receive 
(equal to zero), while in tort law the two generally correspond. Moreover, negative liability should 
also be introduced in order for the injurer and the victim to receive compensation for the gain 
produced. Such compensation should not be paid by the gainer, who should instead be allowed to 
earn the full gain. In this sense both positive and negative liability should be decoupled. Let us see 
now how traditional tort law might be able to tackle this problem. 
The injurer should pay damages equal to the victim’s loss minus the gainer’s gain.
48 The 
exclusionary rule for pure economic loss would hence be optimal. If damages are paid to the state in 
the form of a fine, the victim bears his total loss; he should therefore receive a subsidy equal to the 
gainer’s gain. Alternatively, damages might be paid to the victim only to the extent to which they 
correspond to the gainer’s gain: if higher, the rest should be paid to the state; if lower, an additional 
subsidy should be paid to the victim. The gainer should neither pay nor receive anything. This way 
each party bears all of the external positive and/or negative effects of his actions and optimal 
decisions are guaranteed. 
This solution can be easily verified in the analytical framework described in section 4.4, where 
all parties can take some forms of precaution. Against the background of sections 4.1 to 4.3, the 
solution will be easier. If only the injurer can take precautions (unilateral precaution accidents) or the 
injurer and the gainer can do so (bilateral precaution accidents), then the exclusionary rule paired 
with strict liability is efficient. However, when precaution can be taken by the injurer and the victim 
(bilateral precaution accidents), the tension between providing incentives to the injurer  – 
                                                                  
48 We have assumed that the gainer’s gain is lower than the victim’s loss throughout my analysis; hence, the injurer should 
pay some positive damages. See also footnote 38. 
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compensation equal to the social loss – and providing incentives to the victim – compensation equal 
to the gainer’s gain – arises again and decoupling becomes necessary. 
Finally, it should be noticed that the decoupling solution proposed rests on a strict liability 
framework, where no negligence criterion applies. 
5.4  Second best solutions and anatomy of lawmaking 
In real-world legal systems, decoupling solutions are rarely implemented. More likely are liability 
rules that comprise a negligence inquiry. Negligence is a device that empowers tort law. Normal, 
non-decoupled liability rules, in fact, only provide incentives to one party: strict liability to the injurer 
and no liability to the victim. The introduction of a negligence inquiry produces instead incentives for 
both parties:
49 as one party is induced to take precautions in order to be found non-negligent and 
escape liability, the other – the residual bearer – is induced to take precautions in order to minimize 
the total cost he bears. The default liability rule in most legal systems is a negligence rule, generally 
comparative negligence. The issue of negligence and its interaction with the magnitude of damages 
should hence be carefully taken into account as, when the negligence inquiry is implemented, the 
optimal magnitude of the damages award varies. However, the issue of negligence in relation to pure 
economic loss has been as yet almost completely neglected. 
The results of the analytical sections of this study also show that in most cases neither the 
recovery rule nor the exclusionary rule yield the first best outcome, as summarized in table 1. 
 
TABLE 1  [INCLUDE IT HERE] 
 
The attention of the early economic commentators to the economic loss problem was centred on the 
magnitude of compensation only. My contention is that the magnitude of compensation required to 
induce an efficient (often second-best) outcome varies with three elements: the respective 
importance of parties’ precautions for the determination of the accident loss, the presence of 
negligence, and the implementation of additional incentive devices, such as subsidies. An analysis of 
the problem without inclusion of each of these important factors is bound to be incomplete. 
Moreover, since the determination of the magnitude of damages depends on other legal 
formants, uniformity ought not to be necessarily expected. Different national rules concerning the 
                                                                  
49 See Cooter and Ulen (2000), supra note 18. 
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determination of the damage award in similar cases might be justified by differences in liability 
regimes or by the presence of ad hoc subsidization or taxation of the parties. Traditional economic 
analysis tends to suggest that, given some economic characteristics of the specific case under study, 
a certain rule for the damage award should apply (either the recovery or the exclusionary rule). 
Moreover, if the choice of the rule only depends on economic factors exogenous to the legal system, 
the solution tends to legitimise itself as universally valid. As a result, variations among legal systems 
are generally classified as inefficient or are simply unexplained.
50 My analysis encourages 
endogenizing the choice of the compensation rule in a broader picture that comprehends other legal 
elements, so as to explain differences in damages awards among the various legal systems. 
6  Conclusions 
This study has examined the economic side to the pure economic loss problem and tried to draw 
some guidelines for an economic interpretation of actual legal doctrines. It differs from the traditional 
economic approach in several respects. 
First, pure economic loss is interpreted as the problem of internalising positive externalities 
through a mechanism, tort law, primarily designed for the internalisation of negative externalities. All 
the parties to an accident are taken into account and it is argued that, not only can the injurer take 
precautions in order to reduce the expected accident loss, but also the victim and the gainer can take 
some measures in order to mitigate the loss and increase the gain respectively. The parties’ capacity 
is regarded, in this respect, as a form of precaution and it is hence not necessarily inefficient to 
increase it over the level that would be optimal in the absence of accidents. 
Secondly, different liability rules are examined against this background and it is noticed that 
there is a potential tension between providing incentives to the injurer and providing incentives to the 
victim. It is demonstrated that the first best solution would be to decouple both positive and negative 
liability in order to make all the parties internalise costs and benefits of their actions. This solution is 
not straightforwardly implemented in reality, and legal systems more often rely on different 
configurations of the negligence rule. It is interesting that, under different liability rules, the optimal 
magnitude of damages varies  – a result that partially contradicts previous law and economics 
analyses, which only consider strict liability rules. 
                                                                  
50 Bussani, Plamer and Parisi (2001), supra note  8, derive indifferent results at times, showing that both the recovery rule 
and the exclusionary rule might be efficient under certain circumstances. 
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From this premise, it is possible to conclude that an economic analysis of the different legal 
doctrines concerning the pure economic loss problem should not be limited to the study of the 
magnitude of the damage award – the problem whether compensation should include the victim’s 
private loss or should be limited to the socially relevant loss – but should also comprise a study of 
other important elements of the legal system, namely the discipline of negligence and the presence of 
other incentive devices, such as subsidies. Moreover, since the rules governing the compensation of 
pure economic loss endogenously depend on other elements of the legal system, some variations 
among different national regimes ought to be expected and do not necessarily indicate inefficiency. 
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Table 1: Incentives to take precautions under different liability rules with recovery rule or 





LIABILITY RULE  RECOVERY RULE 
(damages=victim’s loss) 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
(damages=victim’s loss minus 
gainer’s gain) 
Strict liability  X   ￿ ￿  Injurer 
Simple negligence  ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ 
Strict liability  X (injurer) 
X (victim) 
￿ ￿ (injurer) 
X (victim) 
Simple negligence  ￿ ￿ (injurer) 
X (victim) 








￿ ￿ (injurer) 
X (victim)
 
Strict liability  X (injurer) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
￿ ￿ (injurer) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
Injurer and 
gainer 
Simple negligence  ￿ ￿ (injurer) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
￿ ￿ (injurer) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
Strict liability  X (injurer) 
X (victim) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
￿ ￿ (injurer) 
X (victim) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
Simple negligence  ￿ ￿ (injurer) 
X (victim) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
￿ ￿ (injurer) 
X (victim) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
Injurer, victim 
and gainer 




￿ ￿ (gainer) 
￿ ￿ (injurer) 
X (victim) 
￿ ￿ (gainer) 
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